In Ukraine, time is not on Russia’s side

In Ukraine, time is not on Russia’s side

It might seem that Putin’s victory in Ukraine is just around the corner—but victory would not be so easy

With the failure of Ukraine’s counteroffensive this summer and the growing reluctance in the U.S. and Europe to continue funding the Ukrainian military, it might seem that Russia need only wait in order to achieve victory on its terms.

The remark by General Valerii Zaluzhny, Ukraine's commander in the counteroffensive, that the war had reached stalemate, may be too optimistic. In a stalemate, time is on no one’s side. But with the prospect of Ukraine losing financial support, time might be running out for the kind of war that it has been waging.

There are other factors that make a continuing stalemate less likely. Russia has created a formidable defensive position. While the war has been costly in casualties and destruction on both sides, Ukraine is less able to bear the costs alone. Moreover, the disruptions in food and energy supplies create global pressures for ending the war. While most sympathize with Ukrainian resistance to the Russian invasion, the only outsiders who benefit from continuing the war are the arms merchants. Lastly, Israel’s war in Gaza has diverted world attention and created new uncertainties.

It might seem, therefore, that Putin’s victory is just around the corner. He can wait for the withering of Ukrainian internal capabilities and external support, and then complete his project of victory with the installation of a puppet government. But victory would not be so easy. Venturing beyond its defenses would expose Russian logistics to Ukrainian resistance and would re-ignite Western backing, possibly with air power.

And victory, even if achieved, would be a strategic catastrophe for Russia. It would cement enmity with Europe and the U.S. sanctions would become irreversible. Isolation would increase dependence on China, complicating Russian vulnerabilities on its Siberian front. Controlling Ukraine would be a drain on Russian resources even greater than the occupation of Afghanistan. The continued militarization of the Russian economy would preempt diversification away from relying on petroleum revenues.

Demographically, Russia is not simply getting older, like the rest of Europe. The post-communist crisis of the 1990s caused a severe decline in births, creating a shortage in the current workforce. This has been amplified by the exit of thousands of middle-class Russians.  

Victory would not make Russia great again. It would expose and accelerate its decline.

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